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ABSTRACT 
Following the episodes of WorldCom, Enron , Pmmalat, Lehman Brothers , Nortel (in 
Canada), corporate governance and its impact on shareholder value has been brought in 
into the forefront of the debate. Studies on the relationship between corporate governance 
and the performance of firms to date suggest a positive association between corporate 
governance and various measures of performance of companies .. Unlike the widely 
dispersed ownership in countries like United States and United Kingdom, the ownership 
of companies in Canada is concentrated a controlling shareholder (usually a wealthy 
family) owns majority of the equity and ownership of firms. In Canada studies on the 
relationship between corporate governance and various performance indicators of firms 
are mixed. The present study examines the relationship between corporate governance 
and firm performance in Canada using financial performance data of 152 firms in 2009 
and corporate governance ranking of those firms. 
The empirical results based on regression (ordinary least squares) showed that an 
overall corporate governance variable has a positive impact on firm's performance in 
Canada. These results are invariant to the choice of firm performance indicators like 
Return on Asset (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE). These results are broadly in 
conformity with earlier studies (although there were mixed results in earlier empirical 
investigation). These results are also interesting given the fact that Canadian ownership 
structure is more concentrated. Most of the Canadian companies are listed also in US 
markets and that provides impetus for corporate governance practices to be implemented 
in Canada as well. Given these facts, the empirical results are not surprising. Apart from 
IV 
these facts, these results are based on data set of 152 Canadian companies for 2009 only; 
there is need for more empirical verification and calibration. But that is beyond the scope 
of the present study due to constraint of resources and time. 
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Introduction 
The issue of corporate governance of firms has been in the forefront of debate in 
recent times. The episodes of WorldCom, Enron, Parmalat, Lehman Brothers etc, has 
highlighted the role corporate governance in a firm's performance 1• Corporate governance 
relates to the ways in which the suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of 
getting a return on their investmene (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
In modern corporations, the problem of corporate governance 1s related to the 
separation of ownership from control of firms 3. The seminal articles of Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) discuses the agency problem associated 
with separation of ownership and control. According to Jenson and Meckling (1976), a 
manager who owns anything less than 100 per cent of the cash flow rights of the firm have 
potential conflicts of interest with the remaining shareholders who do not exercise control 
1 Concerns about corporate governance have developed historically in reaction to major confidence crises, 
corporate frauds and market failures, and this prompts us to examine the role that corporations play in the 
economy (Hendry 2005). 
2 This definition is relatively narrower and the major criticism about this definition was that it addresses only 
the investor returns. There are other stakeholders such as employees, communities, supplies and customers 
and interests of all these groups are also needs to be internalized in corporate governance definition (Tirole 
2006). 
3 Agency theory argues that the central problem of corporate governance is how shareholders ensure that 
self-seeking executives act in the shareholders ' interests rather than their own. The division of ownership and 
control has had wider ramification for the nature of corporate governance. Salaried managers who are 
running the companies are hired on behalf of the shareholders who are the owners of the company. 
According to the agency theory, the managers may behave opportunistically to maximize their own welfare 
(Arrow ,1985). 
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over the firm. They argue that managerial ownership (through bonus, stock options) 
increases the alignment of interests of managers with outside shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). One of the important issues in corporate governance is how the interests 
of public shareholders are aligned with corporate goal. The public shareholders, who 
normally have first claim on firm's cash flow, feel the adverse consequences of poor 
corporate governance. Good corporate governance is important as it promotes the efficient 
use of resources. It also enables firms in attracting low cost investment capital. 
The relationship between corporate governance and the performance of firms is 
widely researched (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, Love, 2010). Most of the evidence to date 
suggests a positive association between corporate governance and various measures of 
performance of companies. Unlike the widely dispersed ownership in countries like 
United States and United Kingdom, the ownership of companies in Canada is concentrated 
a controlling shareholder (usually a wealthy family) owns majority of the equity and 
ownership of firms (Morek and Yeung, 2006). Some studies with respect to Canada on 
various aspects of corporate governance like board composition and fi1m value show that 
greater independence of the board does not have a positive influence on firm value 
(Erickson, Park, Reising and Shin, 2005). On the other hand, another study of state-owned 
enterprises in Canada showed that board size and board independence is positively related 
to firm technical efficiency (Ben-Amar and Andre 2006; Bozec and Dia 2007). Given the 
divergent empirical results with regard to corporate governance variables and firm 
performance in Canada, it would be interesting to examine empirically using some of the 
recent data, the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in 
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Canada. The present study contributes to the literature and debate on the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance based on 152 Canadian companies 
for 2009. 
The study is organized as follows: Chapter II reviews the literature on the subject. 
Chapter III discusses the data base and methodology. Chapter IV presents the results of the 
empirical investigation and Chapter V summarizes the conclusions. 
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Chapter II 
Literature Review 
The literature on corporate governance is rich and has been rapidly growing both 
inside academia and outside academia. In this chapter we briefly review the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the impact of corporate governance of on company financial 
performance. This chapter is organized as follows: Section 1 deal with the concept of 
governance. Section 2 reviews the relationship between board composition, characteristics 
and firm performance. Section 3 reviews the relationship between the Managerial ownership 
in the firm and the firm performance. Section 4 examines the relation between executive 
compensation and firm performance. Section 5 deals with the link between Shareholder 
rights issues and firm performance. Section 6 briefly reviews the empirical literature on 
various indicators of corporate governance and firm performance. Section 7 summarizes the 
conclusions of this chapter. 
Section 1 Corporate governance-concept 
The separation of ownership and control in firms leads to the need for corporate 
governance (Berle and Means, 1932; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). According to Shleifer and 
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Vishny (1997), corporate governance is the mechanism in which suppliers of finance assure 
themselves a return on their investment. Fama (1980) disregard the entire notion of 
ownership of the firm and argues that there is only contractual relationship between the firm , 
security holders and the managers. According to Fama (1980), market is the leading force 
that discipline bad performance. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) describe the firm as a "black box" operating with the 
objective of maximizing profits subject to certain constraints. An agency relationship is a 
contract under which the principal assign the agent to perform some service on their behalf 
which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent. As the relationship 
between the stockholders and manager of a corporation is a pure agency relationship, the 
issues associated with the "separation of ownership and control" are intimately associated 
with the general problem of agency and when management do not own the entire firm ' s 
equity, shareholders incur agency costs resulting from management 's shirking and perquisite 
consumption and a zero agency cost firm can be one where the manager is the firm's sole 
shareholder (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
According to Rezaee (2004), corporate governance addresses the agency issues raised 
by the separation of ownership and control of corporations. Corporate governance is the 
mechanism by which a corporation is managed and monitored. Corporate governance 
determines a power-sharing association between corporation executives and investors. 
Effective corporate governance mechanisms facilitate this relationship by providing structure 
through which the objectives of both parties are clearly are defined, the policies and 
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procedures are established to ensure achievement of these objectives; and activities, affairs, 
and performance are monitored (Rezaee 2004). 
The division of authorities and responsibilities of different participants m the 
corporation IS specified by corporate governance and the basics of a proper corporate 
governance are the underlying concept of accountability and responsibility instead the idea of 
who has the power and who is in charge. "Under effective corporate governance, 
management is accountable to the board of directors and the board of directors is accountable 
to the shareholders with the purpose of creating shareholder value" (Rezaee 2004). 
Section 2: Board composition, characteristics and company performance 
An alternative to direct monitoring by stakeholders is governance through the board 
of directors, who are elected by shareholders. The relationship between shareholders, board 
and top management is a subject of last literature. Board composition of an organization can 
be defined as the combination of several elements such as board independence, board size, 
independence of compensation committee, independence of audit committee, independence 
of nominating committee that recommends new directors in to the board etc. Other factors 
that can influence the board composition are the division between the roles of the CEO and 
the chairperson of the board, number of directors serve together in various organizations ' 
boards, the number of companies ' boards a director serves, CEO succession planning 
procedure etc. We briefly review some of the important aspects of board of directors in the 
following paragraphs. 
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Board composition 
The composition of board of directors is a key element in the internal governance of 
any organization. Board independence is mostly determined by the ratio of inside to the 
outside directors. Various researchers have varying opinions about the relationship between 
the number of insiders and outsiders on the board and its impact on the perfonnance of a 
corporation. Those organizations that deviate from an optimal number of independent 
directors may eventually meet with poor corporate performance (Pfeffer 1972). Baysinger 
and Butler (1985) argue that companies where the board is dominated by non-executive 
directors perform better than boards that are not (Butler and Baysinger 1985). In Klein ' s 
(1998) opinion there is a positive relationship between the presence of inside directors and 
the performance of a firm notably when the inside directors serves in finance and investment 
committees. When a majority of inside directors included in these committees the firm 
accounting and stock market performance improves (Klein 1998). 
According to Vance (1968), a large percentage of outside directors is negatively 
linked with corporate performance. Similarly Bhagat and Black (1999) argue that there is a 
negative correlation between the proportion of independent directors and firm performance. 
It is argued that boards with, a high proportion of NEDs may be detrimental to companies as 
they may stifle strategic actions (Goodstein et al. , 1994), overwhelm the company in 
excessive monitoring (Baysinger and Butler, 1985), lack the business knowledge to be truly 
effective and lack real independence (Demb and Neubauer, 1992). Dahya et al. (1996), 
Stewart (1991) and Rechner and Dalton (1991) suggest that by reinforcing responsibility and 
authority to executive managers, effective performance may be achieved. 
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The literature has increasingly suggested that boards dominated by outsiders or non-
executive directors (NEDs) may help to alleviate the agency problem by monitoring and 
controlling the opportunistic behavior of management (Williamson, 1985; and Jensen and 
Meckling, 197 6) and also by ensuring that managers are not the sole evaluators of their own 
performance (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). Such boards may also help in reducing 
management consumption of perquisites (Brickley and James, 1987) and removing non-
performing CEOs and other board personnel (Weisbach, 1988; and Pettigrew and McNulty, 
1995). Pearce and Zahra (1992) believe that boards dominated by Outside directors may 
influence the quality of directors ' deliberations and decisions and provide strategic direction 
and enhancement in performance. Outside directors also provide diverse world view due to 
their expertise, prestige and contacts (Tricker, 1984; Kesner and Johnson, 1990; and Grace et 
al. , 1995). 
The empirical evidence on the value of outside directors on corporate performance is 
mixed. Millstein and MacAvoy (1998) found US corporations with a higher proportion of 
active independent boards perform much better than those with passive, non-independent 
boards. Using Economic Value Added (EVA) as a measure of performance, the California 
Public Employees ' Retirement system (Calpers) concluded that companies with boards 
engaged in governance practices that signal independence outperform their peers and 
produce higher returns for their shareholders (Regan, 1998). 
According to Dehaene et al (200 1 ), the number of external directors has a significant 
role in an organization ' s performance. It was found that the ROE of the company improves 
when the number of external directors increases in the company director board. Their study 
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also reveals that there is no significant impact on firm performance from higher number of 
board directors or from the combination of CEO-Chairman and conclude that the size of 
directors will not enhance the company net income and a smaller board may take decisions 
and act upon the much quickly. 
Studying board composition in New Zealand, Prevost, Rao and Hossain (2002) find 
that firm performance and board composition are together determined with each having a 
positive influence on the other. Firm performance can be impacted by board composition as 
well that the board composition may affect firm performance (Prevost, Rao and Hossain 
2002). This research finding reiterate the idea that outside board members have a positive 
influence on firm performance and that better performing firms are motivated to add 
independent members to the board. Very high levels of inside ownership are associated with 
higher outside directors as most often firms increase their use of outside directors in order to 
mitigate the potential negative entrenchment effect brought about by high inside ownership 
(Prevost, Rao and Hossain 2002). 
Erickson et al (2005) examined the relationship between board composition and firm 
value in the presence of significant ownership concentration using publicly traded Canadian 
companies. According to the study, the greater board independence does not have a positive 
impact on firm performance. The evidence from the study indicates that firm value has a 
negative relation to the proportion of outside directors in Canada (Erickson, et al. 2005). 
This is mainly due to the fact that outside directors are generally not effective monitors in a 
Canadian-type governance environment. Lefort and Urzua (2008) examine the importance of 
independent directors as an internal governance mechanism in companies with high 
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ownership control. Using a four year, 160 company board composition data, the study finds 
that an increase in the outside company directors in the board creates a positive impact on the 
company value (Lefort and Urz'ua 2008). While the board composition and corporate 
performance outcome varies from context to context and there is no unique governance 
model applicable, it is essential to examine what roles the regulations can take part in to 
make the boards more effective. In New Zealand, the 1993 Companies and Financial 
Reporting Acts that impose liability for poor decision-making had a discernible impact on the 
relationship between outside board representation and firm performance. The study finds 
that the Companies and Financial Reporting Acts did not improve the positive relationship 
between outside board representation and firm performance. Thus, the legislation appears to 
be low impact on the relation between board composition and firm performance (Hossain, 
Prevost and Rao 2001). 
In contrast, Agrawal and Knoeber ( 1996) found a significant negative relationship 
between board outsiders and firm performance based on Tobin's Q. Rhoades et al. (2000), 
using meta-analysis, found a weak link in performance when there is dominance of either 
insiders or outsiders on the board as opposed to a balanced board. Baysinger and Butler 
(1985), Mehran (1995) and Klein ( 1998) all report non-significant relations between 
accounting performance and the proportion of outside directors. Similarly, Daily and Dalton 
(1998) found no relationship between independence of the board and corporate performance, 
irrespective of the type of performance indicators used (accounting or market return) and the 
manner in which ' board composition ' is measured (outside, interdependent, affiliated) . 
Bhagat and Black (2000) came to the same conclusion using both performance measures. 
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Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) in the US and Weir et al. (2002) in the UK found no 
significant relationship between the proportion of non-executive directors and performance 
based on Q-ratio. 
Board size 
The board size is an aspect of board composition that can influence the corporate 
governance structure of an organization. According to Jensen (1993), when board increase, 
they become less effective in monitoring the mangers as the coordination and the process 
problem outweigh the benefit of a large board. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) states that the 
norms of behavior in most boardrooms are dysfunctional, because the directors rarely 
criticize the policies of top managers or hold candid discussions about corporate 
performance. Mintzberg (1983) as cited by (Dalton, Johnson and Ellstrand 1999) points out 
that board member' assessments of top executives are susceptible to manipulation when 
boards are large and diverse. Board size can be considered as measure of an organization ' s 
ability to form environmental links to secure critical resources (Dalton, Johnson and 
Ellstrand 1999). 
Researches in to the optimum board size yielded some interesting results . According 
to Jensen(l993), when board get beyond seven or eight people, they are less likely to 
function effectively and will be controlled and manipulated by the CEO much easily. Other 
scholars recommend restricting the board membership to ten people, and they prefer the size 
of eight to nine (Lipton and Lorsch 1992). The Cadbury committee (Cadbury Committee 
1992) recommends that the ideal size of the board should be between eight to ten members. 
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The empirical evidence suggests that the size of the board does matter (Monks and 
Minow, 1995) as it influence the degree of monitoring, controlling and decision making in a 
company. Small boards are said to help in alleviating the effort problem and in becoming 
more effective (Jensen, 1993; and Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). However, when small firms 
grow too big, boards become more symbolic rather than being a part of the management 
process (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2000). 
Conversely, bigger boards may be constructive for some companies because a bigger 
board provides diversity that would help companies to secure critical resources and reduce 
environmental uncertainties (Pfeffer, 1987; Pearce and Zahra, 1992; and Goodstein et al., 
1994). Lipton and Lorsch (1992) advocate board membership to be between eight and nine, 
and any additional benefits from increased monitoring gained by additional membership will 
outweigh the costs associated with slow decision making, the effort problem and easier 
control by the CEO (Jensen, 1993). 
Using a sample of large US corporations and controlling for other variables, Yermack 
(1996) found a significant negative relation between board size and market performance 
based on Tobin's Q. Eisenberg et al. (1998) also found similar patterns using a sample of 
small and midsize Finnish firms. In contrast, Holthausen and Larcker (1993) failed to find an 
association between the two variables using US data. A study that draws a large sample of 
firms from 52 countries to investigate the relationship between firm performance and the 
number of directors find that there is a positive relationship between the prior performance 
and the number of directors (Heaney, et al. 2007). 
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Duality and Multiple board membership 
Another corporate governance issue that has given rise to concerns is the role duality 
or the ' dominant personality' phenomenon, where the CEO is also the chairman of the board. 
Stewart ( 1991) argues in favor of the role duality as it helps enhance decision making by 
permitting a sharper focus on company objectives and promoting more rapid implementation 
of operational decisions. Likewise, Dahya et al. ( 1996) believe that role duality allows a 
CEO with strategic vision to shape the destiny of the firm with minimal board interference, 
which could also lead to improved performance resulting from clear, unfettered leadership of 
the boards (Rechner and Dalton, 1991). In contrast other scholars believe that although there 
is no problem if the two roles are combined, separation of the two roles will, on the other 
hand, provide essential checks and balances over management' s performance (Argenti, 1976; 
Stiles and Taylor, 1993; and Blackburn, 1994) as someone who holds two top positions is 
more likely to pursue strategies which advance personal interests to the detriment of the firm 
as a whole (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; and Jensen, 1986). 
Empirical analyses of the impact of role duality on various corporate performance 
measures have yielded conflicting results. Boyd (1995) found evidence of better 
performance for US firms with role duality. However, Rhoades et al. (200 1) found firms 
with a separation of the two roles consistently have higher accounting returns compared to 
those that have the roles combined. In contrast, Peel and O'Donnell ( 1995), Dahya et al. 
(1996) and Balinga et al. (1996) found no significant difference in the performance of 
companies with or without role duality. The UK studies by Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) 
and Weir and Laing (1999) also came to the same conclusion. Davidson et al. (1996), using a 
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two-sample t-test, found the results to be mixed in sign and not statistically significant. 
Brickley et al. ( 1997) found no systematic link between duality status and organizational 
performance or market value. 
Multiple board membership and same directors serving various boards are creating a 
close knit bloc of directors. This also makes the directors dysfunctional as they have less 
time to serve the interests of the shareholders. Multiple directorships makes the members of 
the board of directors very busy and make the incapable of delivering their job efficiently. 
This in tum influences the firm performance. 
Empirical evidence concerning multiple board membership provides mixed results. 
A study by Sarkar and Sarkar(2009), in the context of India found that multiple directorship 
has positive aspects as interconnected board directors are able to arrange better access to 
external capital. The study argues that independent directors with multiple appointments can 
exert much more positive impact on company performance as apparently they are much more 
committed in their governance role, attending more board meetings against directors with 
fewer appointments. However excessive multiple directorships for inside directors are likely 
to hurt company value. These conclusions are largely in contrast to the current evidence 
from the US studies and provide support to the "quality hypothesis" that busy outside 
directors are I ikely to be better directors, and the "resource dependency hypothesis" that 
multiple directors may be better networked thereby helping the company to establish more 
linkages with its external environment (Sarkar and Sarkar 2009). 
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Most often multiple board memberships can be resulted in less number of board 
meetings. Less frequent board meetings can be a challenging issue with regards to corporate 
performance. Conger et al(1998) suggests that the duration of a board meeting is an 
important resource that can improve the effectiveness of the company board. (Conger, 
Finegold and Lawler III 1998). According to Vafeas (1999), role of corporate boards in 
public corporations is a central issue in financial and academic world. 
The study by Vafeas (1999), suggests that board meeting frequency is related to 
corporate governance and ownership characteristics that agree with contracting and agency 
theory. The market may find a board less valued if boards meet frequently mainly due to the 
fact that the share price declines followed by higher meeting frequencies. However, years 
with an abnormally high meeting frequency are followed by improvements in operating 
performance. The study also examined the CEO turnover in firms that have an abnormal 
board meeting frequency. The rationale behind this examination was that the authority to 
recruit and dismiss the top executives is vested in the board of directors. There is no 
evidence found in this study that there is any significant relation between board meeting 
frequency and CEO turnover. This study results has specific importance as it reveals the 
day-to-day effect of board monitoring on corporate performance. In addition to that, the 
results of this study are consistent with prior research suggesting that companies adjust the 
structure of their boards in response to poor performance (Vafeas 1999). 
Section 3: Managerial ownership and firm performance 
Shareholding pattern of the directors and managers can also affect the company 
performance significantly. If the board of directors and the higher executives like the CEO, 
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own significant amount of company shares, the interests of shareholders and the managers 
can be better aligned. 
The relationship between firm ownership structure and firm performance has been an 
ongoing debate in the corporate finance literature and finance circles for a long time. In the 
wake current corporate scandals like Enron, Nortel , WorldCom etc , this subject of corporate 
governance has much more relevance. It is the managers or agent' s natural tendency is to 
assign the valuable resources of the firm in their own best interests, which in tum may 
conflict with the interests of outside shareholders. 
If the equity ownership of the managers increases, their interests will coincide more 
closely with those of outside shareholders, and hence the conflicts between managers and 
outside shareholders can be minimized up to an extent (Jensen and Meckling 1976). The 
studies of (Morek, Shleifer and Vishny 1988), (Hermalin and Weisbach 1991) and 
(McConnell and Servaes 1990) identify that "alignment of interest" take places at low levels 
of managerial ownership but can create " entrenchment" at higher levels of management 
ownership by using Tobin ' s q as a proxy of firm value and they report a quadratic functional 
form and do not detect any inverse relationship between firm performance ownership 
structure especially over the 5-25% ownership range. 
The relationship between the distribution of equity ownership and corporate 
performance for 349 publicly traded Australian firms in 1986 and 1989 was analyzed by 
Craswell et al (1997). The results faintly support a curvilinear relationship between insider 
ownership and corporate performance, although the relationship is both temporally unstable 
and inconsistent across different firm-size groups. The evidence does not hold institutional 
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ownership as an important determinant of Australian corporate performance (Craswell, 
Taylor and Saywell 1997). A study by Chen et al(2003) conducted in 123 Japanese firms in 
order to fmd out the relationship between firm performance and managerial ownership, for 9 
years and the study was using the equity holding of the board of directors as a proxy for 
managerial ownership. The study found a significant interest-alignment effect, given the low 
levels of stockholdings of Japanese managers (Chen, Guob and Mande 2003). 
Rose (2005) conducted in Danish firms to examine the relationship between insider 
ownership and firm value emphasis that there is a significant relationship between insider 
ownership and firm value (Rose 2005). Therefore an increase in the managers share holding 
is advised in order to resolve the agency problem. 
Managerial ownership and firm performance is relatively new concept in Chinese 
corporate world. A study by Li, et al. (2007) on privatized Chinese state enterprises 
concludes that managerial share ownership, particularly CEO ownership, is directly related to 
firm performance. Firms with higher managerial share ownership significantly outperform 
those with lower managerial share ownership by 2-3% in terms of operating and net return 
on assets. Growth in real operating and net profits is also increased up to 70% higher for 
firms with high managerial share ownership. The ownership- firm performance relationship 
found to be more effective at low levels of CEO ownership. The study asserts that firm 
performance keeps increasing as management ownership increases. (Li, et al. 2007). 
In line with above mentioned research findings, Bhabra (2007), substantiate earlier 
research findings of a curvilinear relationship of firm value and insider ownership reported 
for larger markets. According to the empirical study conducted in a sample of publicly 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE: A STUDY OF CANADIAN COMPANIES -2009 
18 
traded firms with data over 1994-1998 in New Zealand, there is a non-linear cubic 
relationship between Tobin ' s q and the percentage of shares owned by insiders. Insider 
ownership and firm value were found to be positively related for ownership levels below 
14% and above 40% and inversely related at intermediate levels of insider ownership 
(Bhabra 2007). This research study reiterates the ideas of Jensen and Meckling(1976) that 
the incentive alignment through share ownership is not linearly related to firm value. 
However several other studies have shown that the relationship between the 
managers ' firm ownership and the corporate performance are not linear. Berte and Means 
thesis suggests as cited in (Demsetz and Villalonga 2001) that an inverse correlation can be 
observed between the shareholdings structure and the organizational performance. Demsetz 
(1983) argues that the ownership structure of a corporation should be considered as an 
endogenous outcome of decisions that reflect the influence of shareholders regardless of the 
ownership structure. This means that a firm ' s ownership structure reflects decisions made by 
the current owners or potential owners like traders or of those who are engaged in the 
acquisition of the firm (H. Demsetz 1983). The ownership structure that emerges ought to be 
influenced by the profit-maximizing interests of shareholders, regardless of the ownership 
structure be concentrated or diffuse. This implies that there should be no logical relation 
between change in ownership structure and change in firm performance (H. Demsetz 1983). 
In one of the most classical studies in corporate governance, (Demsetz and Lehn 
1985) do not observe any relationship between ownership concentration and corporate 
profits. Similarly, another research examine the link between acquisition performance and 
managerial equity holdings using a simultaneous equation system and it is their fmdings that 
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managerial ownership does not enhance firm performance, but firm performance negatively 
affects managerial ownership (Loderer and Martin 1997). By using a three-equation 
simultaneous equation system in which corporate value, investment , and managerial 
ownership, are treated as endogenous variables, Cho (1998) finds that investment affects 
corporate value, which, in tum, affects ownership structure, but there is no reverse causality 
from ownership to corporate value. 
Using long-term return, Han and Suk (1998) examined the effects of insider 
ownership and institutional ownership simultaneously against stock return of several firms 
and they argue based on empirical evidence that as insider ownership increases, stock returns 
increase but excessive insider ownership can hurts corporate performance (Han and Suk 
1998). Other schools of thoughts argue that many prior studies fall short to control for 
unnoticed firm heterogeneity and, therefore, the documented evidence of relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm performance can possibly be unauthentic 
(Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia 1999). 
Conflicting research studies that describe the relationship between the board structure 
and firm performance is presented across the geographical areas and this mandates further 
investigation that considers the unique characteristics of the location and the context in which 
the firm operates. 
Section 4: Compensation and firm performance 
As we discussed about the agency problem, one of the major question arises; what is 
the root cause for agency issues. Is it because top company executives' greed for more 
compensation? The level of compensation and the extent of pay-for-performance for chief 
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executive officers (CEOs) has been a topic of considerable controversy in the academic and 
business communities. It is the arguments of the critics of CEO compensation practices that 
because the board of directors is influenced by the CEO, the board often does not structure 
the CEO ' s compensation package to maximize value for outside shareholders. (Core, 
Holthausen and Larcker 1999). 
There are different questions that are being raised by all stakeholders including the 
shareholders such as the magnitude of firm performance improvement if the executives are 
paid more and in what form these compensations needs to be structured. It is the opinion of 
Murphy (1985) that the interests of the manager ' s and shareholders can be brig in alignment 
by linking corporate performance and executive compensation (Murphy 1985). Even though 
several studies have conducted in this subject, still there is no clear answer regarding right 
compensation structure that can eliminate agency problem and improve firm performance. 
In their seminal article Jensen and Murphy (1990) describes the problem that 
corporate America pays its most important leaders like bureaucrats and that is the reason why 
the CEO's act like bureaucrats and the solution for this problem is to pay more to the CEO 
(Jensen and Murphy 1990). In their opinion, equity-based compensation rather than cash 
compensation provides managers the correct incentive to maximize firm value (Jensen and 
Murphy 1990). 
However, some other scholars are arguing against the above arguments. Some argues 
that there is little empirical evidence on whether corporations whose executive compensation 
is more equity-based actually perform better (Mehran 1995). In an empirical study by 
Mehran (1995), it was found that both Tobin' s Q and return on assets are positively related to 
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the percentage of executives ' total compensation that is equity-based as well as the 
percentage of shares owned by top managers. This implies that the compensation certainly 
affects CEO incentives in ways that have a measurable impact on corporate efficiency 
(Mehran 1995). 
Effectiveness of any corporate governance mechanisms are related to the context in 
which the corporation is functioning. Thus culture, legal aspects, the nature of the ownership 
such as family or public and the way market responds to changes can be varying form 
countries to countries. Unite et al (2008) conducted a study on the relationship between the 
top executive compensation and firm performance in Philippines. The researchers focused 
their analysis on the investigation of both the sensitivity and elasticity of executive pay 
relative to firm performance. According to the researchers the primary advantage of the 
sensitivity approach is that it has a more natural economic interpretation because of the fact 
that the coefficient represents the executive's share of value creation. The researchers 
articulate that, the sensitivity approach provides a natural measure of the severity of the 
agency problem since agency costs arise when agents receive less than 100% of the value of 
output (Unite, et al. 2008). The study observed a positive relation between pay and 
performance and in addition to that the researchers find that in the Philippines this pay-
performance relation does not appear to hold for those firms that are affiliated with a family 
corporate group. The research concludes that affiliation with a family corporate group can 
affect managerial goals, where market-based and accounting-based measures of performance 
are relatively less important, and are perhaps overshadowed by non-performance-related 
group goals (Unite, et al. 2008). 
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According to (Core, Holthausen and Larcker 1999), organizations in the United States 
with weaker ownership and monitoring mechanisms have greater agency problems that will 
be reflected as higher CEO pay regardless of the fitm performance. Their study observes that 
ownership structure and board structure are related with the level of CEO compensation, after 
controlling for the standard economic determinants of compensation such as the requirement 
of the firm for a high-quality CEO, previous firm performance, and risk. When it comes to 
the ownership structure, the study finds that CEO compensation is a decreasing function of 
the CEO's ownership stake (Core, Holthausen and Larcker 1999). Additionally, CEO 
compensation is lower when there is a non-CEO internal board member or an external block 
holder who owns at least 5% of the shares. 
Concerning board-of-director structure, CEO compensation ts found to be a 
decreasing function of the percentage of the board composed of inside directors, and is an 
increasing function of board size, the percentage of the board who are outside directors 
appointed by the CEO the percentage of outside directors who serve on three or more other 
boards and whether the CEO also is board chair. In summary both board characteristics and 
ownership structures have a substantive cross-sectional association with the level of CEO 
compensation (Core, Holthausen and Larcker 1999). One hundred and seventy four Japanese 
corporations were investigated by Basu et al (2007) to determine the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and executives ' compensation. 
The study result fmds that greater stock ownership by the .board is associated with 
higher top executive income. Alternately the researchers find that in Japanese firms, top 
executive compensation decreases as the corporate governance structures become stronger. 
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As reinforcement to these findings, the research also finds evidence of a negative relation 
between the compensation predicted by the ownership and monitoring variables and 
subsequent accounting performance. However no association is found with future return 
performance of the organization (Basu, et al. 2007). The results suggest that Japanese firms 
with weaker governance structures have greater agency problems. The results indicate that 
CEOs at firms with greater agency problems are overpaid and the firms with greater agency 
problems perfonn worse (Basu, et al. 2007). Although there is a growing literature linking 
corporate governance to company performance, there is, equally, a growing diversity of 
results and this necessitates further study in individual corporate governance mechanisms 
including external and internal corporate governance control mechanisms as well as 
corporate governance as a whole and the effect of corporate governance in firm performance. 
Section 5: Shareholder rights issues 
It can be verified that when shareholder rights are more restricted, the firm is more 
likely to be diversified and weak shareholder rights allow management to diversify the firm 
unwisely, resulting in a decline in value (Jiraporn, et al. 2006). While analyzing the 
shareholder rights in an organization several questions needs to be answered. Can the 
shareholders to vote for individual directors, or only the entire slate of nominees and the 
company has a majority voting policy? What is the share holders say on CEO and executive 
compensation policy? Companies with better corporate governance practices are tend to be 
respecting shareholders rights much more than companies with weaker shareholder rights. 
The empirical evidences show that firms where shareholder rights are weaker tend to 
repurchase less stock and this can be due to the fact that the " .. managers of firms with weak 
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shareholder rights are better able to exploit the weak shareholder rights and retain more cash 
within the firm, potentially to extract private benefits as alleged by the free cash flow 
hypothesis. Managers of firms with strong shareholder rights, on the contrary, are forced to 
disgorge cash to stockholders in the form of repurchases" (Jirapom 2006). 
An empirical study by Jirapom, et al. (2006) find that that firms where shareholder 
rights are weak are more likely to be industrially diversified and the explanation for this 
diversification is that the managers exploit the weak shareholder rights and diversify the firm 
unwisely. As a result, industrially diversified firms exhibit a reduction in value (Jirapom, et 
al. 2006). 
According to La Porta et al (2000) corporate governance is a set of mechanisms that 
outside investors use to protect themselves against expropriation by the insiders. In Asian 
countries, there is a negative relationship between the separation of ownership and voting 
rights and firm value (Claessens, Djankov and Lang 2000) and in line with this argument (La 
porta, et al. 2002) states that there is evidence of higher firm valuations in countries where 
better protection is provided for of minority shareholders and in firms with higher cash-flow 
ownership by the controlling shareholder. In their empirical research they explain the 
consequences of corporate ownership for corporate valuation in different legal regimes and it 
is empirically proven that poor shareholder protection is penalized with lower valuations, and 
that higher cash-flow ownership by the controlling shareholder improves valuation, 
particularly in countries with poor track record of investor protection (La porta, et al. 2002). 
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Section 6: Corporate governance and Organizational performance 
It is a fact that several studies on the corporate governance has failed to provide 
convincing answers with respect to the relationship between corporate governance and 
organizational performance. More and more literatures and studies are being published in 
this subject area. We discussed recent research on the importance. The number of corporate 
governance mechanisms and their impact on overall corporate performance are widely 
discussed. However, all these discussions fail to provide a definite answer about the right 
choice and number of corporate governance provisions that can provide a definite outcome in 
terms of corporate financial performance. How various corporate governance provisions 
affect the outcome of organizational performance is a an important question that has to be 
answered as most often corporate governance provisions can work as a motivating factor for 
managers to perform for the benefit of shareholders (Kang and Shivdasani 1995). 
According to Heracleous (200 1 ), there some important interwoven reasons why 
" best practices" in corporate governance failed to find convincing connections between 
corporate governance and organizational performance. In their article the authors illustrates 
the reasons for this weak relationship that may be evident in the studies between corporate 
governance and firm performance are the possibility that ''bestpractices" are irrelevant to 
performance and the operationalisation of theoretical concepts has low face validity. The 
studies are too narrow, aiming to relate board attributes directly to organizational 
performance and ignoring other systemic factors (Heracleous 2001). 
In developed countries such as UK, USA, impact of firm-level variation in corporate 
governance behavior on market value can be minor. In contrast, firm-level governance 
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behavior has a huge effect on market value in developing countries (Black 2001). In 
emerging and transitioning countries, effective governance in all economic transactions has a 
critical role to play (Dharwadkar, George and Brandes 2000). As context has a unique 
importance in corporate governance analysis (Heracleous 2001), it is essential to examine 
how corporate governance is related to organizational performance in developing countries 
as well as in developed countries. 
Firm performance and corporate governance empirical results: a review 
Using Brunswick Warburg corporate governance rankings as a benchmark, a study 
was conducted on twenty-one Russian firms to examine the corporate governance. The study 
results suggest that the organizations can significantly improve firm share values through 
better corporate governance practices, and therefore the cost of raising equity capital can be 
reduced. It also suggests that the possible value of minimum quality regulation, which can 
reduce the potential for adverse selection, and thus improve market value of the firm. The 
implication of this study is that the investors should devote major attention to developing 
measures of governance behavior and quantifying how governance behavior affects firm 
value (Black 2001). Another empirical study in Russia finds that firms that can cut 
unproductive costs and being led capably with outside monitoring can be much more 
competitive (Judge, Naoumovab and Koutzevol2003). 
While conventional corporate governance mechanisms fail to provide a clear answer 
to firm performance, it may be necessary to investigate alternate corporate governance 
strategies. An examination of how alternative corporate governance mechanisms work in 
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Japan, using a detailed panel data on the equity ownership and bank loans of individual 
manufacturing companies over the period from 1985 to 1998 was conducted by Hiraki et 
al(2003) . The researchers examined the governance roles undertaken by main bank; 
intemperate shareholding, and managerial ownership among Japanese manufacturing firms 
which list their shares on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The research objective was to 
investigate on the extent to which alternative governance mechanisms are related to firm 
value. " .. .If a particular governance mechanism is effective in monitoring managers, it 
should enhance firm performance and hence be positively related to firm value across the 
sample firms" (Hirakia, et al. 2003). The research shows that cross shareholding can have 
detrimental effect on firm performance whereas a one-way ownership by lending institutions 
can influence firm performance positively. This means that lenders can influence the 
performance of Japanese firm by effective monitoring (Hirakia, et al. 2003). 
Industries undergo enormous stress during recession times as the agency problem can 
be aggravated during such testing times. "The incentives for expropriation by controlling 
shareholders will increase during a financial crisis; the agency problem between controlling 
and minority shareholders is particularly serious at such times" (Baeka, Kangb and Suh Park 
2004). In this context it will be interesting to see how firms will be behaving in terms of 
corporate governance mechanisms and subsequent organizational fmancial performance. 
Korean financial crisis was a testing time for Korean industries and organizations with 
regards to the strength of the corporate governance mechanisms that they engaged. 
A research by Baeka, Kangb and Suh Park (2004) examined the importance of 
corporate governance measures in determining firm value during a crisis like one Korea 
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experienced in 1997. It has been evident in the research that firms with larger equity 
ownership by foreign investors and firms that have higher disclosure quality and alternative 
sources of external fmancing experience a smaller reduction in their share value. In contrast, 
firms where ownership is concentrated in owner-managers and/or affiliated firms displayed a 
larger drop in equity value. Firms in which the controlling shareholder' s voting rights 
exceeded the cash flow rights and those that indebted more to the main banks also had 
significantly lower returns. We find similar effects for highly diversified firms, those with 
high leverage, and those that are small and risky. This means that during a crisis, differences 
in governance practice at the firm level play an important role in determining firm value 
(Baeka, Kangb and Suh Park 2004). 
An unbalanced panel of 1721 firms from 1980 to 1995 was observed in a study that 
has a cumulative a total of22,776 firm year observations by Nelson (2005). According to the 
study typical firms adopting governance provisions requiring shareholder endorsement 
outperform benchmark portfolios for 1, 2, 3 and 5 years prior to adoption. Whereas, typical 
firms adopting poison pills underperform benchmark portfolios for 1, 2, 3 and 5 years prior 
to adoption. Major factors that can influence the firm performance are levels of institutional 
ownership, levels of insider ownership and the number hostile bids. Shareholders can be 
mainly concerned with perfonnance, and are more likely to vote to increase the power of the 
boards of directors of better performing firms, while the boards of poorly performing firms 
are much more likely to initiate governance changes, such as poison pills, that circumvent 
shareholder approval (Nelson 2005). 
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Using a corporate governance index that rates firms by incorporating six different 
corporate governance dimensions such as (1) board accountability, (2) fmancial disclosure 
and internal controls, (3) shareholder rights, (4)remuneration, (5) market for control, and (6) 
corporate behavior and by combining these categories in to a single index, the researchers 
(Bauer, eta!. 2008), analyze whether Japanese firms with many governance provisions have 
a better corporate performance than firms with few governance provisions. According the 
study (Bauer, et a!. 2008) of well-governed and poorly governed firms, the researchers find 
that well-governed firms considerably outperform poorly governed firms by up to 15% a 
year, even after correcting for market risk and size and book-to-market effect. The study also 
noted that the provisions that deal with financial disclosure and internal control, shareholder 
rights, and remuneration have a significant impact on stock performance where as provisions 
that deal with board accountability, market for control and corporate behavior do not affect 
stock performance. These findings attribute to the belief that in corporate governance of a 
firm, all the corporate governance mechanisms are not equally important to affect the firm 
performance (Bauer, et a!. 2008). 
After the economic bubble period spanning from late 1980 to the first half of 1990, 
Japanese economy fell into deep recession called "lost decade". In a Japanese corporate 
governance research (Sueyoshi, Go to and Omi 201 0), it was found that firms try to change 
the corporate governance mechanisms in unusual situations like economic recessions. The 
same research investigated to find out whether the economic reforms on corporate 
governance amplified or decreased the operational performance of Japanese manufacturing 
industries. The study shows that the Anglo Saxon model of corporate governance may not be 
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suitable in Japanese manufacturing environment as Anglo Saxon style of reforms on 
corporate governance have reduced the ratio of shares held by stable shareholders in Japan 
where as in the United States several internal and external mechanisms can work as 
motivating factors for the managers to augment shareholder wealth (Kang and Shivdasani 
1995, Sueyoshi, Goto and Omi 2010). 
The stable shareholding by cross-shareholding is one of traditional corporate 
governance systems. However, the stable shareholding becomes effective only when the 
ratio of shares held by stable shareholders is more than 61.21%. In addition to that the 
foreign investment can improve the corporate performance of Japanese manufacturing 
industries until the ratio of shares held by foreign shareholders attains 19.49%. This implies 
that a balance between foreign corporate governance ideas and Japanese traditional corporate 
governance systems can improve the corporate performance (Sueyoshi, Goto and Omi 2010). 
It has been seen that every geographical areas need to have unique set of corporate 
governance practices or mechanisms. A number of Japanese firms do have several corporate 
governance mechanisms and the number of corporate governance provisions can be varying 
from fum to firm. 
The literature review indicates the necessity to investigate the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance based on the context in which the organization 
operates. It will be the right approach to compare the corporate governance ranking of the 
firm in developed in the country in which the firm operates and compare that with the 
financial performance of the firm in order to get a better understanding. This approach is 
much relevant while evaluating corporate governance as the impact of both internal and 
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external corporate governance mechanisms on the corporate performance are depending on 
the unique characteristics of the country in which the organization operates. 
While examining the corporate governance and firm performance, it is necessary to 
take examine various corporate governance systems in place. Donker and Zahir(2008) 
identifies some of the major rating systems such as Institutional Share Holders Services 
corporate governance quotient, Standard &Poor corporate governance quotient, Governance 
metric international (GMI) index, The corporate library board effectiveness rating. However 
it is their contention that the corporate governance ranking system is not impartial and can be 
influenced by various factors such as country and legal aspects, revealed preferences versus 
stated preferences and the scaling each rating system uses can be totally different for 
company to company and country to country (Donker and Zahir 2008). 
Section 7: Literature review summary 
Based on the literature review, the summary of the hypothesis is given below 
Corporate Governance Variables 
1 )Board composition 
• Insider/outsider ratio( board independence) 
• Audit committee independence 
• Compensation committee independence 
2 ) Shareholding and compensation 
• Directors shareholding pattern 
Financial Performance -ve /+ ve 
+ve 
+ve 
+ve 
+ve 
-ve /+ ve 
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• Directors shareholding trend 
• CEO shareholding trend 
3)Share holder right issues 
• Company allows shareholders to vote for 
directors 
• Majority voting policy 
• Shareholders say on compensation 
4) Disclosure issues 
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-ve /+ ve 
-ve /+ ve 
+ve 
+ve 
+ve 
+ve 
-ve /+ve 
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Chapter III 
Data base and methodology 
This chapter reviews the database and methodology used in this study. This chapter is 
organized as follows. Section 1 discusses the database discussed in this study and section 2 
presents the methodology used in this study. 
Section 1: Database 
The corporate governance index used in this study (for Canada) is the widely used 
index published by Globe and Mail . The companies included in this study will be drawn 
from list of Canadian companies listed in the Toronto stock exchange and those are ranked 
by Globe and mail corporate governance ranking .In 2009, 157 Canadian corporations were 
ranked by Globe and Mail based on their corporate governance performance score in a total 
marking scheme of 100. Out of 100 marks, Board Composition, had a weight of 31 per cent 
in the overall index. Shareholding and compensation had a slightly lower weight of 24 per 
cent. Similarly shareholder rights issues had 33 weight of 100 with 12 subcategories and 
finally disclosure issue had a weight of 12 per cent of 100 with 10 sub categories (See chart 
3.1) 
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Chart 3.1: Weights ofVarious Corporate Governance Components in Globe and Mail Index 
"' .... ..1: 
Q.O 
"(ij 
~ 
Ql 
u 
c 
nl 
c ... 
Ql 
> 
0 
C) 
35 
30 
25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
0 
Board Share Holding Share Holder Disclosure 
Composition and 
Composition 
rights 
Governance components 
Issues 
• Governance Weights 
This study took one hundred and fifty two companies from the rank list to investigate 
the relationship between corporate governance and firm financial performance. Total assets, 
return on assets, return on equity and debt/asset ratio were obtained from Osiris database 
available through UNBC library website . The definition of variables and sources are given 
in Table 3. 
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Table 3.1-Definition of Variables and Sources 
Variable Definition Source 
ROA Return on Assets(%) OSIRIS database. 
ROE Return on Equity(%) OSIRIS database. 
TA Total Assets (in million C$s) OSIRIS database. 
DIE Debt-Equity Ratio OSIRIS database. 
DumO Overall corporate governance Derived from Globe and 
indicator Mail data 
Duml Board Composition Derived from Globe and 
Mail data 
Dum2 Share Holding and Composition Derived from Globe and 
Mail data 
Dum3 Share Holder rights Derived from Globe and 
Mail data 
Dum4 Disclosure Issues Derived from Globe and 
Mail data 
Methodology 
This study uses a cross relation regressiOn method (OLS) to examme the relationship 
between firm performance (ROA, ROE) and other determinants including corporate 
governance variables i.e., 
Firm Performance= a+ ~ Firm Corporate Governance Variable it +y Controls it+ t: it (3.1) 
Here the firm performance is measured by Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity 
(ROE). Controls are observable firm characteristics that could influence the firm 
performance. We have taken total assets and debt-equity ratio as control variables. The 
aggregate corporate governance score (Di) of each Canadian company was constructed with 
a dummy variable(s) (D) using the following criteria. 
D=l if y > -
I y 
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Where - is the mean value of the corporate governance index. 
y 
The study uses the following functional form 
ROA = a0 + a 1log(TAh + a2 (DIE) it+ a3 Firm Corporate Governance Dummy it+£ it (3.2) 
It is hypothesized that a 1 >0, a 2 < 0, a 3 >0. 
ROE= a0 + a 1log(TAh + a2 (DIE) it+ a3 Firm Corporate Governance Dummy it+ sit (3.3). 
It is hypothesized that a 1 >0, a 2 < 0, a 3 >0. 
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We also used individual dummies for each component of corporate governance index of 
Globe and Mail as follows. 
ROA = a0 + adogTA + a 2 debt+ a 3 dummy! + a4 dummy2 +as dummy3+ a 6dummy4+ E 
ROE= a 0 + adogTA + a 2 debt+ a 3 dummy I+ a4 dummy2 +as dummy3+ a6dummy4+ E 
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Chapter IV 
Empirical Results 
This chapter presents the results of the empirical investigation. This chapter is 
organized as follows. Section 1 presents basic statistics of the data used in the empirical 
investigation. Section 2 presents results of the empirical investigation. Section 3 summarizes 
the main conclusions. 
Section 4.1 
Summary Statistics and Some Stylized Facts 
The average asset size of the firms in the study is $29,140 million. However, the 
median size is only $3330 million which indicates that there is considerable variation in the 
firm size among 152 Canadian companies used in the study (Table 4.1 ). The lowest size of 
firm in the study is $71 million while the largest firm has an total asset size of $654, 989 
million. In general, total asset size variable is positively skewed (skewness = 5). 
The average return on assets (ROA) is 2.16 per cent with median value substantially 
higher at 2.99. The lowest ROA was -47.15 while firm with the highest ROA was 26.08. 
Unlike total assets, ROA is negatively skewed (-2.35 per cent). Similarly, return on equity 
(ROE) also showed wide variation. The average ROE was 0.04 per cent with median value 
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well above it (0.08) indicating that the data series was negatively skewed (-3 .78). The lowest 
and the highest ROE were -1.42 per cent and 0.37 per cent respectively. 
Table 4.1: Basic Descriptive Statistics 
Overall Debt/E 
Basic Total Corporate Dum Dum Dum Dum quity 
ROA ROE 
Statistics Assets Governance 1 2 3 4 Ratio 
Dummy 
Mean 29140 0.49 0.57 0.57 0.53 0.53 64 2.16 0.04 
Median 3330 0.04 1.00 0.04 0.04 0.04 38 2.99 0.08 
Standard 
Deviation 92714 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 82 8.11 0.21 
Skewness 4.91 0.02 -1.94 -1.94 -2.01 -2.02 2 -2.35 -3.78 
Range 654918 1 1 495 73.2 1.79 
Minimum 71 0 0 0 0 0 0 -47.1 -1.42 
Maximum 654989 1 1 1 1 495 26.08 0.37 
Number of 
Observations 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 
The debt-equity ratio which indicates the magnitude of leverage of firms in the study 
also showed wide variation. The average debt-equity ratio was 64 per cent with the lowest 
value being zero (with no debt) and the highest value was 495 per cent. Out of 152 
corporations 7 5 corporations were above the overall corporate governance mean value and 
were given a dummy variable of 1 and the rest 77 were given zero. 
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Section 4.2: Cross-Sectional Results 
Table 4.2 summarizes the results of the cross-section regression results based on 
ordinary least squares for equations 3.2 and 3.3 (given below) . 
ROA = a0 + a 1log(TA)it + a2 (D/E) it + a3 Firm Corporate Governance Dummy it+ E it 
ROE= ao + adog(TA)it + a2 (D/E) it+ a3 Finn Corporate Governance Dummy it+ E it. 
Table 4.2: Determinants of Firm Performance in Canada - 2009 (ROA and ROE) 
Independent variables Diagnostics 
Eq. 
Dep. 
Constant Corporate 
variable Log(TA) DIE Governance - R2 DW F 
Aggregate Dummy 
-1.35 0.37 -0.01 2.91 
3.2 ROA 0.06 2.02 3.3 
(-0.38) (0.82) (1 .98)** (2.1 0)** 
-0.26 0.04 -0.01 0.06 
3.3 ROE 0.13 1.84 7.4 
(-2.9)*** (3 .17)*** (-2.7)*** (1 .87)* 
Note : 1. Figures in brackets are ' t ' -values. 
2. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at 1%,5% and 10% respectively. 
The ROA equation (equation 3.2) shows that corporate governance variable has a positive 
impact on firm performance. Moreover, the corporate governance dummy variable is 
statistically significant at 5 per cent. Total assets variable is also positively related to firm ' s 
performance (ROA) but is not statistically significant. Debt-Equity ratio has a negative 
impact on finn 's performance and is statistically significant. The overall explanatory power 
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of the equation is relatively modest (R2 = 0.06) but is considered reasonable given the nature 
of the cross-section data. 
The ROE equation (equation 3.3) is better than ROA equation as all the independent 
variables (total assets, DIE ratio and corporate governance) variable is statistically significant 
and has the expected (hypothesized) signs. In this equation also, the corporate governance 
variable has a positive impact on firm ' s performance (ROE). The overall fit of the equation 
is also relatively high (R2 =0.13). The equation is also devoid of auto-correlation problems as 
evidenced from durbin-watson statistic of close to 2. 
We consider that the relationship of firm performance in terms of ROE and corporate 
governance has much stronger relationship than ROA as ROE is influenced by the market 
forces. Most often ROA is calculated using historical value of assets and in may not be 
representing the true nature of the assets of the company. 
Table 4.2 reports the empirical results where disaggregated corporate governance 
variable for each attribute (dummy 1 to dummy4) was used in the estimation. The results are 
generally unsatisfactory as most of control variables (total assets and debt-equity ratio) and 
disaggregated dummy variables were not statistically significant. Among the corporate 
governance variables only shareholder rights variable was statistically significant 
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Table 4.3: Determinants of Firm Performance in Canada- Dependent Variables ROA & ROE- 2009 
Constant 
Log (Total Assets) 
Debt-Equity Ratio 
Corp. Gov. Dummy1 
Corp Gov Dummy2 
Corp Gov Dummy3 
Corp Gov Dummy4 
Number of Observations 
Diagnostics 
R Square 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 
F- Value 
ROA 
-0.93 
(-0.26) 
0.18 
(0.37) 
-0.01 
(-1.89)* 
2.58 
(1.79)* 
1.45 
(0.90) 
3.10 
(2.06)** 
-2.59 
(-1.66)* 
152 
0.10 
2.1 
2.73 
Note : 1. Figures in brackets are 't' -values. 
ROE 
-0.27 
(-2.99)*** 
0.04 
(3.04)*** 
-0.1 
(-2.63)*** 
0.05 
(1.40) 
-0 .01 
(-0.01) 
0.07 
(1.78)* 
-0.06 
( -1.50) 
152 
0.15 
1.9 
4.26 
2. ***,**,*indicates statistical significance at 1%,5% and 10% respectively. 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE: A STUDY OF CANADIAN COMPANIES -2009 
Section 4.3 
Conclusions 
42 
The present study examined the relationship between firm performance and corporate 
governance indicators of 152 Canadian firms for 2009. The data set of Canadian companies 
displayed wide variations. The average asset size of the firms in the study is $29,140 
million. The lowest size of firm in the study is $71 million while the largest firm has an total 
asset size of $654, 989 million. The average return on assets (ROA) is 2.16 per cent with 
median value substantially higher at 2.99. The lowest ROA was -47.15 while firm with the 
highest ROA was 26.08. Similarly, return on equity (ROE) also showed wide variation. The 
average ROE was 0.04 per cent with median value well above it (0.08) indicating that the 
data series was negatively skewed ( -3 . 78). The lowest and the highest ROE were -1.42 per 
cent and 0.37 per cent respectively. The debt-equity ratio which indicates the magnitude of 
leverage of firms in the study also showed wide variation. The average debt-equity ratio was 
64 per cent with the lowest value being zero (with no debt) and the highest value was 495 per 
cent. 
The empirical results based on regression (ordinary least squares) showed that overall 
corporate governance variables have a positive impact on firm's performance in Canada. 
These results are invariant to the choice of firm performance indicator (like ROA and ROE). 
These results are broadly in conformity with earlier studies (although there were mixed 
results in earlier empirical investigation). Given the fact that these results are based on data 
set of 152 Canadian companies for 2009 only, there is need for more empirical verification. 
But that is beyond the scope of the present study due to constraint of resources and time. 
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Chapter 5 
Concluding Observations 
The issue of corporate governance of firms is in the forefront of debate recently 
following episodes of WorldCom, Enron , Parmalat, Lehman Brothers, Nortel (in Canada) 
has brought into the forefront of the debate the role corporate governance in firm ' s 
performance. 
Studies on the relationship between corporate governance and the performance of 
firms to date suggest a positive association between corporate governance and various 
measures of performance of companies. Unlike the widely dispersed ownership in countries 
like United States and United Kingdom, the ownership of companies in Canada is 
concentrated - a controlling shareholder (usually a wealthy family) owns majority of the 
equity and ownership of firms . In Canada studies on the relationship between corporate 
governance and various performance indicators of firms are mixed. The present study 
examines using some of the recent data (of 152 firms in 2009), the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance in Canada. 
The data set of Canadian companies displayed wide variations. The average asset size 
of the firms in the study is $29,140 million. The lowest size of firm in the study is $71 
million while the largest firm has a total asset size of $654, 989 million. The average return 
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on assets (ROA) is 2.16 per cent with median value substantially higher at 2.99. The lowest 
ROA was -47.15 while firm with the highest ROA was 26.08. Similarly, return on equity 
(ROE) also showed wide variation. The average ROE was 0.04 per cent with median value 
well above it (0 .08) indicating that the data series was negatively skewed ( -3. 78). The lowest 
and the highest ROE were -1.42 per cent and 0.37 per cent respectively. The debt-equity 
ratio which indicates the magnitude of leverage of firms in the study also showed wide 
variation. The average debt-equity ratio was 64 per cent with the lowest value being zero 
(with no debt) and the highest value was 495 per cent. 
The empirical results based on regression (ordinary least squares) showed that an 
overall corporate governance variable has a positive impact on firm's performance in 
Canada. These results are invariant to the choice of firm performance indicators (like ROA 
and ROE). These results are broadly in conformity with earlier studies (although there were 
mixed results in earlier empirical investigation). These results are also interesting given the 
fact that Canadian ownership structure is more concentrated. Most of the Canadian 
companies are listed also in US markets and that provides impetus for corporate governance 
practices to be implemented in Canada as well. Given these facts , the empirical results are 
not surprising. Apart from these facts , these results are based on data set of 152 Canadian 
companies for 2009 only, there is need for more empirical verification and calibration. But 
that is beyond the scope of the present study due to constraint of resources and time. 
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